Igor Strelkov’s Interview with Kolokol Rossii

Igor_Ivanovich_Strelkov_Yekaterinburg5

Original: Novoros News

Igor Ivanovich presented his vision about how to solve the problem of Transnistria, Novorossiya and Ukraine, his attitude towards the Kremlin camarilla and towards Putin personally, as well as Putin’s role in the history of Russia.

Kolokol Rossii (KR): Igor Ivanovich, first of all, we would like to know your position on Transnistria. It is currently the most urgent topic. Is it possible to draw Russia into a conflict with Moldova and Ukraine? Is the Ossetian scenario, for example, a possibility?

Igor Strelkov (Strelkov): I have already spoken about it. This is yet another attempt to provoke Russia into direct participation in military hostilities, but to provoke in such a way that our country plays the game according to a scenario imposed by the enemy. I have no doubt that sooner or later the enemy will succeed in dragging us into a war and the try to force us to capitulate on the foreign policy front. But there is no chance of our President capitulating—I simply do not believe it. The only question is: where could this conflict take place? Transnistria is, for this purpose, an ideal springboard. Let’s be frank—this area is surrounded on all sides by countries hostile to Russia: Ukraine and Moldova. The fact that these countries are hostile to us is, by the way, an ‘outstanding’ achievement of our diplomacy and foreign policy. These ‘achievements’ include the fact that an absolutely pro-Russian Transnistria where (according to various estimates), 150-200 thousand Russian citizens reside, is in a full blockade.

There is no land connection with Transnistria, and the two countries that border this “last fragment of the Soviet Union” are interested in the absence of Russian troops there, as well as the non-existence of Transnistria itself. Accordingly, Russia will have to act asymmetrically if she wants to protect her ally. We either will have to get involved in an aerial war, which would be extremely disadvantageous, considering that the enemy will have the significant advantage of using ground-based anti-aircraft defences, or to attempt to punch a land corridor through to Transnistria. The latter scenario would immediately be labeled as Russian aggression against the independent states of Ukraine and Moldova. Everything that is happening in Transnistria is the consequence of the indecisiveness, and, I would also say, sabotage by certain individuals in the Russian leadership who were tasked with dealing with the Ukrainian problem a year ago. At that time, a single regiment or a brigade could have paved this land corridor and accomplished what was done in Crimea (albeit only in the territory from Kharkov to Odessa). But, a year later, we now find ourselves at an impasse. Ukraine is definitily preparing for a war, and it is obvious that it intends to attack Transnistria. Anti-aircraft defenses are being built up and and troops—readied.

KR: And how will such a move be legally formulated by Ukraine, since Transnistria is officially part of Moldova?

Strelkov: Of course, all this will done by agreement with Moldova. Whenever I want to understand the actions of an enemy, I ask myself how I would have acted in their stead. This is what I would have done: Organized a few provocations on the border between Ukraine and Transnistria, and then, under this pretext, Moldova would have issued an ultimatum and demanded that Russia withdraw its peacekeepers.

KR: And if Russia does not remove the troops? What then?

Strelkov: Yet another ultimatum—up to and including asking Romania for military aid, and so forth. It all depends on their understanding of how far Russia is willing to go. If they feel that Russia is not ready to defend Transnistria with military force, they will crush it straight away.

KR: And, for now, do they believe that Russia is not ready?

Strelkov: They are trying to move forward in small steps. How did they act in Slavyansk? First, they fired a series of weapons. Has Russia swallowed this affront? Aha! Let us then use bigger mortars! Again, Russia said nothing. Let’s try artillery. Again, Russia is silent. Let’s try using chemical weapons. And use them they did—white phosphorus incendiary shells! After that, they started shamelessly shelling the city with heavy artillery. They understood that Moscow is not prepared to give a real rebuff, and brazenly went ahead. In Transnistria, we are seeing evidence of the same approach. In one of my statements, I already gave the example of the frog that is slowly cooked over low heat. It does not realize until the end that it is being cooked alive, it adapts at each stage until, finally, all of a sudden it’s done for! The work to set up these provocations is now being done by Saakashvili—a man who has absolutely zero regard for the welfare of Ukraine, Odessa, and Russia.

KR: Do you think that his appointment was specifically in relation to Transnistria?

Strelkov: I think that it is no coincidence! Somehow, he was appointed not in Dnepropetrovsk, but in Odessa. It is no accident that the Odessa region borders with Transnistria.

KR: What is the purpose of these actions? To take Transnistria from Russia? To exact vengeance?

Strelkov: They have absolutely no interest in Transnistria itself! It is only a small detail in a bigger geopolitical setup. The primary goal is to force Putin to capitulate. To make him completely lose his credibility and authority. Just like in the old legend, he was brought to a crossroads: one road leads to war; the other—to surrender. What’s more, the road to capitulation also splits—again into war and surrender. This is entire system! If Russia had entered a direct conflict with Ukraine a year ago, then the country and the President himself would have faced an huge number of economic and political negatives, but there would have been enormous positives too—from Kharkov to Odessa! Russia could have regained millions of Russian people, as well as enormous economically developed territories… And now, more than a year later, these advantages are already nonexistent. Now the number of minuses has exceeded all positive aspects. The more we try to negotiate with those, who are in principle against seeing eye to eye, the less our chances to accomplish anything in the near future.

The enemy is constantly getting stronger, it sees our indecisiveness. In the capitalist world—in the world of real predators—everything is simple: If you do not fight back, everyone gangs up against you, from the polar bear to the puny cockroach, and each of them expects to get a piece of the bounty. At this point in time, even Moldova feels that Russia is no bear and is trying to take a bite out of her. The insolence of the Poles, the impudence of the Baltic States will only grow—in step with our own movement backwards and attempts to negotiate.

As it stands now, even if we try to secure the inviolability of Transnistria through diplomatic means, for example by declaring that we are going to fight for it, then, once again, we will end up in a trap. Remember the ‘marvelous’ “Kozak’s plan”, whereby we promised to respect the territorial integrity of Moldova? Similarly, we now recognise the territorial integrity of Ukraine in the Donbass. Wonderful! We no longer have any legal basis to intervene [in Transnistria], except in line with the old agreement with Moldova. If, tomorrow, the Moldovan Parliament decides to denounce this agreement, then we will have no response—legally we would be forced to withdraw our troops.

KR: But Transnistria considers itself an independent republic…

Strelkov: That’s what it claims, but no one has recognised it as such. Transnistria has been an independent republic for a long time (since 1992), and, unlike the DPR and the LPR, it never engaged in any negotiations with Chisinau about becoming part of Moldova with some sort of special rights. However, Russia continues to consider Transnistria to be part of Moldova.

KR: But, if the agreement is denounced by the Moldovan Parliament, then Russia could, in response, recognise the independence of Transnistria—after all, that’s what we did with South Ossetia. Is something like this even possible? And how would this affect the situation?

Strelkov: A recognition is possible. However if the agreement is denounced, and we recognise Transnistria as an independent state, then we would have to fight for it!

KR: Yes, just like in South Ossetia…

Strelkov: The only difference is that, in Transnistria, we have nothing like the Roksky tunnel that would connect Russia with this territory. We have only an air corridor, which we we are impeded from using. Therefore, as I said, there are two solutions for Russia: either to fight or capitulate.

KR: And in this case, could an order be given to the Army of Novorossiya to go on the offensive?

Strelkov: The Army of Novorossiya is three times smaller, in numerical terms, than its opponent. Do you think that such an attack has a chance of victory?

KR: There are reports that two combat-ready corps have been formed.

Strelkov: If, right now, I take a piece of paper and draw up an order to form two combat-ready corps, this, alone, will not yield two combat-ready corps. Yes, last Fall, the combat-readiness of the Army of Novorossiya surpasses that of the Ukrainian Army, but this is no longer the case. The waiting, the negotiations—came up with “Minsk-1” and “Minsk-2″—have exacted their toll… Ukraine, on the other hand, did not waste any time. Moreover, Ukraine’s resources, even in terms of manpower, many exceed the resources of the Donbass—the enemy has simply has more people. Even if every resident of Donetsk and Lugansk had a tank, the population would still not turn into a tank corps. For a military person, this is crystal clear.

KR: Will there be a Minsk-3, but now in relation to Transnistria, after provocations take place there? In order to ensure that the toad is slowly boiled—to again hypnotize Russia?

Strelkov: Ukraine is obsessed with war. Like a drug addict, who is addicted to hard drugs, Ukraine cannot stop fighting. It’s a never-ending circle over there: prepare, assail Russia, get rebuffed, then again get ready for another confrontation. Ukraine cannot exist in peace because all of its resources are directed to war. A victory in this war is the only miniscule chance that Ukraine has of surviving. They cannot freeze the situation. They are doomed to keep fighting because freezing this situation would automatically lead to the Kiev Junta’s downfall. For one simple reason: as soon as there is no doping—in the form of an external enemy in Russia—then uncomfortable questions will immediately begin: Why is everything so bad after the “revolution of dignity”? Only a victory, a complete and total one, would ensure the survival of Ukraine as a state, or rather as a pseudo-state. So they will fight, regardless of the number of Minsk agreements that come to pass.

And here I’ve been wondering: Is Vladislav Surkov (President’s Aide in relation to the Commonwealth of Independent States—Ed.) a complete idiot? Very unlikely! He is a smart and talented person. So, what are we to make of him? He could only be a saboteur! It means that he designed the country’s policies in such a way that they could never lead to success! He formulates the state policy, and, time after time, restarts it: Minsk-1 failed, so he launched Minsk-2, and if the second Minsk fails—he will launch the third! Meanwhile, external circumstances for Russia deteriorate with each such restart. And I am a hundred percent certain that he is well aware that all of this is doomed to failure. It’s simply that this failure is in his interests. It’s profitable for him or for his boss. And who is his boss?

KR: Who???

Strelkov: How did he end up in the Presidential Administration? Let’s recall—he came from the Alfa Group. What is this Alfa Group? It’s Friedman—it is with his help that foreign capital came to Russia during the vaucher privatization period. Even now, Surkov and Friedman are on excellent terms. The question proposes itself: Who do you work for, Vladislav Yuryevich? For the President, or, perhaps, for someone else? The answer, I think, is self-evidence. And it is not for the President.

 

(Source)

Interview with Igor Strelkov: War as a Litmus Test

Original: Eurasian News Fairway

Война как лакмусовая бумага… Интервью с И.И.Стрелковым

According to Igor Strelkov, there is no doubt that Ukraine intends to go to war with Russia.

A correspondent of the Eurasian News Fairway interviewed Igor Ivanovich Strelkov (Igor Vsevolodovich Girkin—military leader of the Donetsk People’s Republic [DPR], a former commander of the insurgents in the city of Slavyansk and organizer of the forces of the People’s Militia in Donetsk) in the course of his visit to one of the cities of the Russian Federation. The visit was arranged for the purpose of raising much needed funds for the population of the Donetsk and the Lugansk People’s Republics [LPR] as well as activating the operations of the local chapter of the “Novorossiya” public movement.

The coup in Kiev was paid for with US funds, was directed by the United States,
and the incumbent Ukrainian government is simply a marionette…

Eurasian News Fairway [ENF]: Igor Ivanovich, I will open with the most “terrifying” question. In your interview with the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies you say that war awaits Russia. What scenarios of its inception and development, methods of conducting it and possible consequences do you see?

Igor Strelkov [IS]: Ukraine will make attempts to strike against Novorossiya with a view to eliminating it entirely, and because Russia cannot allow the destruction of Novorossiya—cannot allow the genocide of the Russian people, the Russian population living there—then Moscow could somehow be drawn into a war. It is difficult to tell what the scale of this involvement could be. But the fact that Ukraine clearly intends to make war against Russia is entirely beyond doubt. Even if Novorossiya is surrendered, Ukraine will sooner or later unleash a war for Crimea because it does not recognize its transition into Russia, is not going to recognize it and almost openly declares that it will fight for the peninsula, by military means if necessary.

ENF: Speaking of war, do you mean a war “at the instigation of”?

IS: Naturally. The coup in Kiev was paid for with US funds, was directed by the United States, and the incumbent Ukrainian government is simply a marionette created for a confrontation with Russia, including by military means. It is for this reason that Ukraine makes no concessions—none whatsoever. Even the most minor. They do not observe even the Minsk accords that are, in principle, theoretically advantageous [to them], but instead use them only as a temporary respite for accumulating forces and a means to further wage ware.

[The Minsk accords] are not in the least favourable to the People’s Republics
and the Militia because
 they signify the elimination of both of them.

ENF: What is your opinion of the Minsk accords?

IS: Generally positive, although I do not believe in their implementation because I have information that leads me to believe that even such advantageous agreements—I emphasize this—Ukraine does not intend to respect. Kiev’s only goal is war—an objective they pursue because their owners demand it of them. 

ENF: Do these accords benefit primarily Ukraine?

IS: Theoretically, yes. In any event, they are not in the least favourable to the People’s Republics (DPR and LPR ‒ed.) and the Militia because they signify the elimination of both of them.

[T]he rebellion had already started: people were already manning the barricades
armed with weapons, and the Ukrainian security forces were killing them.

ENF: In one of your relatively recent interviews—given after your return from war-torn Novorossiya—you mentioned that you acknowledge a certain degree of responsibility for the outbreak of the “hot” phase of the conflict. Does this mean that, in your estimation, the people of the Donbass would not have offered such resolute resistance with the help of Russian volunteers and, shall we say, “other” support from Russia?

IS: You should understand that responsibility can be felt in different ways. It can be experienced as a sense of guilt. But I have not felt guilt as such, and I hope I never will. I continue to carry responsibility for what is happening there because I actively participated in the events, because many people who now fight at the front, who help the Militia—they joined the army because of my appeals, while I was still there. This is the first point.

The second point is that if our unit, which played an organizing role, which served as a fuse, had not arrived in Slavyansk, the uprisings in Donetsk and Lugansk would have been crushed. An organizing force, a centre of consolidation, is exactly what was needed there. But the rebellion had already started: people were already manning the barricades armed with weapons, and the Ukrainian security forces were killing them. Except that this uprising would have ended the same way that it did in Kharkov and in Odessa. In other words, there would have been several dozen corpses in Donetsk and in Lugansk alike, there would have been punitive operations, there would have been arrests and seizures.

There was a chance that this rebellion would not have transformed itself into a large-scale war of national liberation or would have become one at a later stage. But history does not possess a subjunctive mood. What happened, happened. However, because the war marches on and persists, as someone who fired some of the first shots in this war and led a unit that seized the organs of state power in Slavyansk, I naturally carry responsibility.

[Information warfare] creates among people a completely distorted picture.
Such that, when people come face-to-face with reality, they cannot grasp it correctly.

ENF: You have spoken about the Ukrainian side’s use of neurolinguistic programming, in particular, through Channel Five on Ukrainian TV. You have mentioned that you, yourself, felt its effects. We are talking about a component of information warfare. In your opinion, how important is the role of this factor in information warfare, and, in turn, of information warfare in hot conflicts?

IS: Its role is exceptionally important, because it (information warfare ‒ed.) creates among people a completely distorted picture. Such that, when people come face-to-face with reality, they cannot grasp it correctly. The effect it produces is so serious that it is like drug addiction. Moreover, I came across locals who for hours could not tear themselves away from this news programme (Ukrainian ‒ed.) that played in a loop. In other words, when there is nothing new happening, but the same news reel, the same text, is played over and over again…

People simply stared at the television and could not tear themselves away, they stopped caring about their surroundings. These semi-zombies are the ones who volunteer to go fight in the war, collect food aid (for the Anti-Terrorist Operation [ATO] ‒ed.) and seriously believe that the Russian Army, rather than a local militia, is fighting in Ukraine.

ENF: In other words, we are talking about some sort of brainwashing?

IS: Yes, we are talking about brainwashing, you can say so. It is truly brainwashing. Moreover, it has long-term effects—not merely fleeting. People who receive this information, they react very aggressively to anything that contradicts it.

ENF: In your opinion, when did such influencing of the population begin—with the commencement of the military operations in Novorossiya or even earlier?

IS: Already during Maidan. While I was in Kiev in January 2014, watching Ukrainian TV I could already feel the effects of massive exposure.

A good person in war becomes better, while a wretched one—immeasurably more wretched.
In other words, war is like a litmus test.

ENF: Transnistria, Bosnia, Chechnya, Ukraine… There is a saying that war is a drug. So-called “gunpowder poisoning” syndrome. What are your thoughts?

IS: War can hardly be called a drug. But the man who fights a lot naturally gets heightened doses of adrenaline, and the body gets used to them. Upon return to peaceful life, first of all his body feels the lack of adrenaline, everything seems grey, bland, in the sense that in war all events are highly compressed, and the emotions that one experiences there in a week would, in normal life, last him a year. As a result, the pace of life changes.

A person whose body has adapted to a very high pace of life—even to exhaustion, albeit a rich and colourful one—will find it fairly difficult to fit in during peacetime.

Besides, in war everything reaches extremes. Characters become sharply defined; people reveal themselves clearly; human vices and human virtues are seen as if under a magnifying glass. A good person in war becomes better, while a wretched one—immeasurably more wretched. In other words, war is like a litmus test. Those people who are used to living in wartime conditions, they find themselves bound by a heightened sense of justice, they manifest a heightened sense of camaraderie, they start dividing the world into “us” and “them.”

But when they return to peaceful life, where everything is in semitones, they remain on edge, and everything around them seems to them not quite true, counterfeit. Not every person is able to adjust.

I, for example, can easily adjust because I am not only used to it, but also have sufficient knowledge and understanding of the situation. I can observe it from the outside. Although even I experience breakdowns and relapses. But, overall, I would not say that the condition of a person at war is abnormal.

There is also a contrary point of view, that it is the condition of a person during peacetime that is unnatural. We are all abnormal—each in his or her own way. War strips the husk from a human being, and what remains is the essence.

They understood in advance that Strelkov was unlikely to agree to these kinds of terms.
Therefore, measures were taken in advance to ensure that I handed over command.

ENF: In November of last year, the head of the DPR, Aleksandr Zakharchenko, awarded you and Borodai with the title of Hero of the Donetsk People’s Republic. Was this some kind of compensation for moral damages? I am talking about Zakharchenko’s motivation.

IS: I do not know Zakharchenko’s motivations. Considering the fact that at that time Borodai and I had abruptly parted ways, I took this as a kind of insult.

ENF: What specifically offended you?

IS: I do not think that Borodai did anything particularly heroic. Even though I am not going to discuss any of his actions. Soldiers have a saying: “A scout and a rearguard nurse got the Medal of Valour for doing the same thing.” This is exactly how I took it. That’s the first point.

Secondly, the current award policies of the DPR are beneath all criticism, and that is why I am not going to accept any awards or titles from Zakharchenko. All the more so now, when he has essentially demoted himself from the position of an elected head of, albeit unrecognized, but nevertheless a Republic, to a manager of some kind of “separate regions”—well, that’s just ridiculous.

ENF: There are differing opinions about the reasons behind the replacement of Strelkov and Borodai with local cadre. What can you tell us about this?

IS: Negotiations with Ukraine were being prepared, and, naturally, it was appropriate that they be conducted by local people. To this I had no objection. On the other hand, the underlying motive for these negotiations—the future “Minsk-1”—that somehow was developed on our side by that time, demanded unconditional submission by all of the commanders to these terms. Since these conditions, as it turned out, very much resembled a betrayal of Novorossiya, the people [promoting them] understood in advance that Strelkov was unlikely to agree to these kinds of terms. Therefore, measures were taken in advance to ensure that I handed over command. 

ENF: In one of your interviews you said that you were strongly advised to promote yourself publicly. What was the purpose of such publicity?

IS: Yes, there was that. It is difficult for me to evaluate what tactical goal this was meant to achieve; nor was it explained to me. In particular, in this case the recommendation was made by Aleksandr Yuryevich (Borodai ‒ed.). He did not explain to me why this was necessary. But the recommendation was made, and I followed it.

“Do what you must, come what may.” Do what you can.
Even of you are able to do the minimum—that’s something.

ENF: Is your recently increased media activity a sign that you have political ambitions, or is it more to do with the operations of “Novorossiya”, a movement headed by you?

IS: I have no political ambitions. But the volumes of fundraising in aid of Novorossiya, its population and the Militia have plummeted. So my media activity is an attempt to somehow raise the level of donations. The fact that people in Russia have begun gradually to tire of the negative news from Ukraine does not decrease the need for medicine, gear and food.

ENF: How did you come to organise the “Novorossiya” movement?

IS: Upon my return, after a certain period of quarantine, which I had to go through following my return, I faced a question: “What am I to do next?” I would have liked again to serve [in the military], but not only was I not offered any opportunities for continuing to serve in Novorossiya or in Russia, none of my requests in this regard received a response. In other words, relatively speaking I found myself in the same situation as I was in before. Even worse, because I was no longer employed, I became simply a military pensioner that no one, frankly, had any need for.

I could have, of course, gone to the country and sat on the beach catching fish with a fishing rod. But since I feel a great deal of responsibility for what is happening in Ukraine, and what is happening in Novorossiya, I found this unacceptable.

Accordingly, after discussing and thinking over all matters relating to how I could help Novorossiya, I decided as follows: if I cannot help her with arms in my hands, then I will take up something else that is truly needed—organizing supplies, though totally out of character for me and not really my thing, as they say.

For me, believe me, this is something that is quite untypical and very uncomfortable. But it must be done. I understand that it is necessary and also understand that we will never be able to solve all the problems associated with logistics and supply. Not even close. This is something that can only be addressed at the level of a state. But… “Do what you must, come what may.” Do what you can. Even of you are able to do the minimum—that’s something.

I never planned on making a name for myself.

ENF: Finally, a couple of personal questions, if you do not mind.

IS: Try it. I cannot promise that I will answer.

ENF: There is not a wealth of information about you in the Internet. Only meagre details. I have read that you have a humanities education, that you are a historian by training. At the same time, your biography suggests that you are a real soldier, as they say, to the bone. Why did you not go through the standard military education?

IS: In the last years of school, the sight in my left eye seriously deteriorated due to excessive reading. I no longer qualified for a regular military academy as a result, and I did not want to attend a military-political one because my grandfather had a serious dislike for military-political officers [zampolit] (both of my grandfathers were career officers, both fought in the War). His—my grandfather’s—opinion was very important to me.

As a result, in this case, having assessed my prospects, I first made a choice to do what I really loved. I loved history from childhood in school, and because of that the choice of a higher education in history was a natural one. All the more so because my cast of mind is suited to the humanities. Once I finished the institute, after the Soviet Union fell and the unrest began, after wars began, it so happened that I went to Transnistria as a volunteer.

Since then, I have, of course, made returns to history, but only as a hobby. Although I did write a number of scientific articles in between my professional activities. But I never returned to it (history ‒ed.) on a professional basis.

ENF: Now for the final question. It has already become a tradition to question you about your name change. The answers are well known. I have read that you were born Vsevolodovich. People change their patronymics far less frequently than their surnames…

IS: Even now my passport says that my name is Igor Vsevolodovich Girkin. I never changed my surname, my given name or my patronymic. I see nothing exceptional about it. However, when I received pseudonymous documents for my first trip to the “second Chechnya” as an officer of special services, I took a patronymic after my grandfather. I took it for simple reasons: first of all, “Vsevolodovich” is a relatively rare patronymic; secondly, it takes some time to pronounce. Some people who took pseudonymous documents, they would even change their names and become some sort of “Ivans Ivanovich Ivanov”. This is quite common and normal.

I have, incidentally, preserved the identity documents with this name that were given to me by the Chechen Office (the Office of the FSB in the Chechen Republic ‒ed.). This was not done to change my surname. This is a common practice to ensure the safety of servicemen who perform special assignments. And, well, “Igor Strelkov”, it is just a literary pseudonym under which I wrote articles.

I considered it appropriate in Crimea and in Ukraine—where what I was doing reminded me of special operations—to use the old pseudonym. I do not see it as something positive or negative.

Moreover, since I never planned on making a name for myself, it felt completely natural. For instance, they asked in Crimea: “Who is this Igor Strelkov?” Well, only Aksenov knew. But he also knew my real identity. A few others also knew about me. The rest had never heard of Igor Strelkov…

(Source)

Igor Strelkov Interview to PolitNavigator.

1202strelkov-navigatop-1

Alexandr Chalenko: As far as I know, steppe and thermal-vision devices have made light weapons fights impossible in Novorossia. Because of that the parties can’t get close to each other, so this war is the war of artillery. What’s your opinion about it.

Igor Strelkov: The terrain beyond the urban agglomerations, which are so numerous in Donetsk Republic, is very indented: lots of ravines, heights, tree belts, lows grown with bushes. Lots of mines and waste heaps, which make the area closed.

Now it’s a positional warfare, where there is almost no skirmishes with gunfire, it’s an artillery war.

Alexandr Chalenko: I’ve been told that it’s war in the urban agglomeration, because in the heart of Donbass, leaving one town you etner into another one right away. And there’s civilian population living there…

Igor Strelkov: … understand it, war is war. Population suffered and suffers while the war rages, so the sooner the victory is achieved and the war stops, the sooner civilian population suffering stops.

As for the rest: small group tactics.

Alexandr Chalenko: What does it mean? Explain, please

Igor Strelkov: see, in war history, in war theory, there’s such concept as basic tactical unit, that has to fulfill certain tactical tasks. The more military craft develops, the more combat vehicles are improved, the bigger grows the units’ firepower, the lesser get the tactical units.

Relatively speaking, if one task could be solved by the battalion with its firepower druing the WWI, the same task could be solved by companies during the WWII. Now similar tasks can be solved by mere platoons

In this case, the number of armament and its quality, for example, firing rate, became such, that fire density provided by modern platoon, surpasses or at least is equal to one, that battalion of the WWI could provide

Hence, the large masses of people turn into large targets, basically, that’s what has been shown by the UAF around Slavyansk and Donetsk, when having great numerical superiority and way better equipment Ukrainian troops were helpless before us and suffered heavy losses. Due to their crowdness, because they used to move in large masses, large masses of vehicles, and we have been using it. We used the small group tactics — units up to a platoon or less in numbers. They searched for an enemy, pinned it down and called our artillery, mortar strikes upon it. Because of that enemy suffered very heavy losses comparing to our relatively small casualties.

At the same time, the lesser unit is, the harder it’s to hit it, especially in conditions of suburban and urban areas. Enemy had enormous advantage in vehicles, but he couldn’t implement it, since it was like shooting sparrows with a cannon. It’s useless to use the division of “Grads” against the dispersed infantry team. Maybe someone will get hit, but anyway the efficiency would be really low

Alexandr Chalenko: For example now they can’t take the airport in Donetsk. What’s the problem? Why the fights take so long? What would Igor Strelkov do to take the airport under his control completely?

Igor Strelkov: I wouldn’t storm it at all

Alexandr Chalenko: Why?

Igor Strelkov: What for?

Alexandr Chalenko: Because it was believed before the militias started taking it under their control, that Donetsk had been shelled from the airport territory as well as from Peski and Avdeyevka.

Igor Strelkov: Do you imagine the map for yourself? When you manipulate with such names like Avdeyevka, Peski, airport, you don’t imagine yourselve the connection. Adveyevka is a rather large town with 50 thousand population. Peski’s also a rather big settlement. It’s urban type settlement which is abutting to the city. Airport is located between them on a rather large distance. It’s not a single agglomeration.

Artillery can’t be at the airport, Peski and Avdeyevka at the same time. It’s either in one place or in another.

Alexandr Chalenko: So were there any artillery in the airport?

Igor Strelkov: There were artillery spotters there. Indeed, artillery was deployed in Peski and in Avdeyevka. The thing is that, to take the airport, you should simply eliminate this artillery. Object for the assault has been chosen formally by people, who don’t understand a thing in the military art, it was a strike against the consequence, not the reason. To take the airport they had to eliminate the reason, destroy the artillery positions in Peski and Avdeyevka beforehand. Then airport could be taken without any problems.

And now, we have a situation when all infantry attacks at the airport are being repelled by the barrage of artillery that is out of reach.

Alexandr Chalenko: Okay, why it wasn’t clear to those, who had been planning these operations?

Igor Strelkov: Let’s say that these people don’t differ from you in the level of military knowledge and operation planning much.

Alexandr Chalenko: And Motorola?

Igor Strelkov: Motorola is good soldier, brilliant commander on the platoon level. He fulfills the tasks give to him. In this case we’re dealing with strategic decision, with those, who have thrown Motorola and Givi to fight in the airport to take which, was determined as the priority objective. I don’t know who made such decision. I was absent at that time. It was clear for me that it’s not a proper object from the beginning. Attack at the airport is not only unnecessary, it’s harmful, since the best units for the former Slavyansk brigade got scratched and suffered losses there. Without any sense.

See, once they launch an attack, enemy calls the artillery strike.

Alexandr Chalenko: Do I get it right, that this task is possible to be solved?

Igor Strelkov: Yes it is, but not with the forces of infantry units. They have to act with the support of armored vehicles, but since all the vehicles of Slavyansk brigade have been taken to “Oplot” by Zakharchenko, he decides what to do with them.

Alexandr Chalenko: Many of your critics say that Strelkov — is just a mere FSB lt. colonel, so he has no experience of army operations planning. What can you say about it?

Igor Strelkov: Indeed, I’m an FSB colonel, so I’m fine about it, but generally, I wouldn’t advise to call a military with the rank 1 step lower that he is. For the military, ranks have greater value than for civilians. Basically that’s what military hierarchy is built on.

Of course it was difficult for me to command units and subunits, when army grew there were several thousand men in it, and front has been stretched for dozens of kilometers. Naturally we couldn’t create a solid frontline with such small forces.

Alexandr Chalenko: Do you have an army experience of leading such units?

Igor Strelkov: I don’t have such experience, I had experience as a commander of small units, but happened to plan the special operations for 80-100 men. I used to be an operative in field of anti-terrorist operations in Chechnya. I happened to take part in many operations, but to command directly — no. Maximum that I happened to command before were joint operative group of 150 men, for a couple of months in 2005.

And again, units didn’t subordinate to me directly, it was only an operative subordination. I only gave them tasks, which they planned and executed on their own. Now, often, I didn’t understand completely how to organize a certain operation, but instead I had a clear and strict understanding of what I wanted to achieve in this operation.

So, I set the tasks and goals, that had been achievable and they were achieved. Thanks to that, we practically succeeded all enemy plans that were aimed to encircle and eliminate us.

I really lacked the chief of the staff, who could explain what I wanted to soldiers in detail. Basically, all army commanders of high ranks are divided into two categories: chiefs and chiefs of staff. Commander makes a decision, chief of the staff develops it, divides into subtasks. Both job is completely necessary. Far not always good chief of the staff is able to command troops well. And vice versa. For example, it was told about Zhukov in one of his characteristics, that he was a brilliant commander but hates the staff work. Naturally, I don’t compare myself with Zhukov, but, frankly speaking, dislike the staff work too, even more I simply don’t know how to do it. Instead I have a deep understanding of the essence of the guerrilla warfare. I knew qualities of all my units, what they could and what they could not.

At that moment our army was a partisan army. In many aspects it’s still such. It’s not a regular army.

Alexandr Chalenko: What are the differences between them?

Igor Strelkov: On the one hand they’re way more initiative than usual army. On the other hand their discipline is weaker. They solve tasks that regular army overcomes with great efforts. For example to move fast, maneuver, act in field without supplies. These are advantages of the partisan army.

On the other hand they don’t kine sitting in trenches, don’t like sitting in defense, I mean in bad conditions. They’re difficult to lead for those they don’t trust to.

In my opinion, a serious mistake is being made now, when the b regular armies of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics are being built. When they disband already formed units, take from one unit to another. They’re expecting to achieve discipline and subordination to people, who are assigned from above formally. But the army, in its essence, is still a volunteer army. There are no mobilized there. And to arrange without taking this specifics, the formed traditions, into account brings serious harm, since people are losing their motivations. They don’t trust their new commanders, those, who they don’t know.

Alexandr Chalenko: When I’ve been to Donetsk recently, I talked to soldiers from you Slavyansk brigade. I asked them, who were Igor Strelkov for them. They answered “He is like own father to us”. They’re looking forward for your return. And from other soldiers, I found out that about 200 men of your brigade joined “Vostok” brigade after your arrival to Donetsk. They allegedly were from Kramatorsk. Why did they leave you?

Igor Strelkov: You know, it’s a classical example when journalists uses info from OBS “Odna Babka Skazala” [“One Granny Told”] agency.

Alexandr Chalenko: So it has never happened?

Igor Strelkov: 200 men didn’t leave me. One mortar battery joined “Vostok” in the moment of the crisis around Shakhtyorsk. Later returned us the mortars, but soldiers stayed in “Vostok”, they were sent to Shakhtyorsk to support Tsar’s battalion [ed. Tsar — Vladimir Kononov’s callsign]

They’ve got persuaded by someone that we were abandoning Donetsk and they’ve heard that Khodakovsky promised to defend Donetsk until his last drop of blood. They decided to join him because thought that he wouldn’t retreat for sure.

Alexandr Chalenko: They were locals.

Igor Strelkov: Well, yes, our brigade consisted of locals on 90%. It’s a particular example of what the rumors might be.

Units left Kramatorsk by the order of their direct commanders, thinking that they were executing my order, and part of the commandant company left to Izvarino and has been holding corridor there. In my turn, I though that they were all deserters. Later I found out that turns out they were deceived by their commanders, who later appeared on the Russian territory. That…

Alexandr Chalenko: Babay?

Igor Strelkov: Babay. That’s a one rather anecdotic character. But that’s the specifics of the partisan warfare: constant revolts and rebellions.

Alexandr Chalenko: And why haven’t you got in a good terms with other militia commanders — Zakharchenko, Khodakovsky? I even remember that your comrades wrote about them, that they were going to surrender Donetsk …

Igor Strelkov: You can’t make everyone silent [ed. Igor Ivanovich uses idiom here, literally it’s “You can’t cover every mouth with shawl”]. My comrades are free to say whatever they want to. I’ve never said anything like that myself. Though, indeed it looked like the town might be surrendered.

Get me right, when Slavyansk brigade, all ragged, dirty, right from the trencehs entered Donetsk city… people had been fighting for several months, constant shellings every day and night. And so they enter Donetsk. There’s a Kiev government assigned mayor sitting there, no one touches him. Ukrainian police patrols the roads with the state cap badges. And “Vostok” with “Oplot” just stand on the checkpoints. And there are no barricades. You can enter the town. Vehicles would enter and no one would stop it. Donetsk hadn’t fight then and no one was preparing to.

I got an impression, that before our withdrawal from Slavyansk, Ukrainian side didn’t even plan to storm Donetsk, they thought that it would return back to them without a fight.

Alexandr Chalenko: Are these only you impressions, or you had a more precise info that Donetsk had been prepared to be surrendered to Ukraine without a fight?

Igor Strelkov: I’ve never had any precise info about it. Especially when they say that I’ve exchanged Slavyansk for Donetsk, that’s a completely false opinion. I exited Slavyansk not because I wanted to seize Donetsk. Furthermore, I didn’t want to go to Donetsk, commanders who stayed there had been fighting each other. I didn’t want to get into this cloaca, but I had to do it.

There was Russian Orthodox Army split in two acting there. Each part had about 100-150 men. There was “Oplot”, there was “Vostok”, there were Cossack units. There were Bezler’s men. There was a miners’ division, there was “Kalmius” battalion. No one subordinated to no one and didn’t cooperate with each other. Some of them took part in combats, some not. There was a small unit that subordinated to me.

Alexandr Chalenko: You said that you didn’t want to enter Donetsk, where did you want to go after leaving Slavyansk in this case?

Igor Strelkov: I meant that I didn’t want to enter Donetsk to seize power there. That’s what I was talking about. We left Slavyansk because we had to, to avoid the defeat. We had already really been in the complete tactical encirclement. There was the last tiny gap left, the last dirt road, which was uncomfortable and shot through. It could be bloked any moment.

We practically had no artillery rounds. Had no shells for mortars. We had problems with anti-tank weapons. We still had some ammo for the small arms. But the problem was that, that enemy has practically stopped using infantry against us after the fights near Yampol where they suffered heavy losses.

Alexandr Chalenko: And the artillery war started….

Igor Strelkov: Artillery and tanks had been effective to use against us when we had nothing to answer them with. While we had mortar shells and artillery rounds we could hold them somehow. But at the moment we left Slavyansk I had 57 mortar shells. By that moment I had two tanks, but I had less than 1 allowance of ammunition per tank, there were about 35 rounds overall. That’s now a war. Enemy had about 100 armored vehicles, about 30 tanks among them, at the Nikolayevka direction only. There was a completely equipped battalion-tactical group with means of enforcement and massive artillery support. And they strictly used tactics under Nikolayevka. Our grenade launchers failed, more than 20 GLs, all failed. They simply forced our militias into the town and started shelling them with artillery. 5-floor buildings were destroyed to the ground. Armor and artillery. The same situation could repeat in Slavyansk. Taking enemy advantage into consideration we were able to cause them losses only maneuvering all the time. As I said, the small group tactics. When we had no place for a maneuver we could go into defense. In stationary position, when we got surrounded with mine fields and razorwires we couldn’t cause them any serious losses.

Alexandr Chalenko: Let’s dispel another myth of the “OBS” news agency. I’ve heard such a pretension to you in Donetsk, that, when leaving Slavyansk, you didn’t destroy the arms depots.

Igor Strelkov: I simply can’t comment such nonsense. When we were leaving we hadn’t got anything left. We had 6 rounds for our joint artillery division of 9 guns. Which depots? Everything we got via “voentorg”, everything we managed to find in other sources, everything had been sent into fight right away.

Khodakovsky and Zakharchenko had depots. From time to time we had to ask them something for our artillery and tanks.

Alexandr Chalenko: And did they give it to you?

Igor Strelkov: Gave. but not to me, to commanders who got supplies via personal contacts. Zakharchenko used to be subordinate to me at first, until he wasn’t assigned a prime-minister. Khodakovsky didn’t cooperate. Categorically. Simply hadn’t engage in any contact. And since I had other tasks than taming rebellious officers. They sat somewhere — and fine with that. Defended their section — and fine with that. God grant that they would defend it on.

Alexandr Chalenko: Which advantages and disadvantages does the Ukrainian army have?

Igor Strelkov: stable in defense. The very same Russian soldiers. Though they think of themselves as some ancient Ukrs, Ukrainians, or who knows what else. In fact, they are Russian people. They are unpretentious, ready to endure hardships. Basically, all the qualities of the Russian soldier. Fail to see any other strong points in Ukrainian army.

Everything else — result of 23 years of ruination, the same as we had, multiplied on their mentality. Their chiefs… out of any critics. Middle officers — more or less.

Alexandr Chalenko: It’s believed that there were private military companies fighting against you in Slavyansk. Was it so?

Igor Strelkov: can’t say that they were fighting…

Alexandr Chalenko: But they had been there?

Igor Strelkov: they had.

Alexandr Chalenko: Which ones? Polish? American?

Igor Strelkov: I’ve been told about Poles. But also that there weren’t only the Poles there. Again, when you don’t have the corpses with documents you can talk about it very approximately. Why I say that there were PMC troops on Karachun is because I we had messages from Andreyevka, closest village, residents that they went down there to the local shops. Residents told that they were Poles. But they served only as observers and sentry. Maintained thermal vision devices and guarded ATO HQ and HQs of the units that fought against us in Slavyansk. But whether they were on the front lines or not… to prove that we had to achieve a serious military victory capturing enemy territory.

Alexandr Chalenko: Why such little number of locals has been enlisted to your brigade?

Igor Strelkov: Volunteers hadn’t been provided with rifles, nor with boots, nor with uniforms. I had nothing to arm people with. And basically volunteers are always few. Consider the example of the previous Civil War. There were extremely small number of volunteers from both sides. The one who succeeded to conduct mobilization more effectively won. Why did the Reds [ed. Red Army, Bolsheviks] win? Because in critical moment they had more resources that allowed them to conduct the mass mobilization. Yes, they were extremely unstable troops that had been surrendering all the time, but they always had new ones to put instead. Soviet government got all the main arm depots of the Russian Empire. The main military factories happened to be on the territory they controlled. And the most imporant — the apparatus of the former Tsar army got into their hands. Military specialists and all institutions.

In Donbass it’s the same picture as always. And if, God forbid, the war starts in Russia, exactly the same is going to happen. Most of people don’t want war and don’t want to fight And that’s how it should be. Imagine if everyone wanted to fight, what would happen. Some nightmare. Nothing like that is ever going to happen and thank God for that.

But if on a one fine day you get a summon letter you’ll have to go to the recruitment office regardless whether you want it or not. You’ll have a choice: ten years of jail, or, you’re welcome: pack your things and ahead to war. Basically, that’s the way Ukrainian army is mobilized now. Nobody wants to fight there too, but they’re mobilized and sent to fight.

If I had enough weapons and specialists in Donetsk, I would launch the mobilization. First thing that minister of defense had to do was the mobilization. But I had no resources at all. So we had to take only the volunteers, but we hand’t got enough equipment even for the all volunteers. By moment I left Donetsk I still had 150 unarmed men, however I had already had several thousand men army. As far as I know 27 or 28 thousands enlisted in May. They were ready to fight in militia. But there was nothing to arm them with.

I had to assign them a commander, but commanders didn’t come. Most of the reservist officers, the soviet among them, evaded.

Like in Russian in 1991, when they surrendered their own state. Practically no one stood up for then.

Alexandr Chalenko: Excuse me, but you hadn’t stand up then either.

Igor Strelkov: Excuse me, I hadn’t been an officer then too. I was a student. By that time I hadn’t even taken the oath, but they had.

There was a very little number of officers in Slavyansk.

Alexandr Chalenko: Have you talked to them?

Igor Strelkov: Yes. At first the Afghanistan Veterans Union came. 24 men came. 6 officers among them. They told that “Yes, we are ready to serve. At the barricades close to house, that it”. I answered “No, thanks. The ones who enlist will be serving as in the army, because I don’t need those who would stand on the barricades. I need people who would be ready to follow orders”. 3 men came back on the next day, only one officer among them. Everyone else decided that it wasn’t comfortable for them.

Alexandr Chalenko: When In Ukraine they say that NATO will be arming Ukrainian army with their weapons, how serious is such info? Because Soviet and NATO standards are different. They’ll have to re-educated, re-train. And NATO armament supplies cost a lot.

Igor Strelkov: I think they won’t be rearming. They don’t need it. They have plenty of any vehicles. Enough for 3 more wars like this one. Besides, now the arms depots in Poland and Hungary are opened for them.

Alexandr Chalenko: Soviet vehicles.

Igor Strelkov: Poles, Czechs, Hungarians will be rearming, switching to the NATO standards.

Alexandr Chalenko: What’s, in ideal, is required to defeat the Ukrainian army, after all?

Igor Strelkov: It’s impossible to achieve victory fighting half-heartedly [ed. literally, “half-fighting, or 1/4-fighting”]. To defeat Ukrainian army you have to fight. Ukraine, even in its pitiable condition has way more resources than DPR and LPR. Donetsk and Luhansk Republic won’t be able to defeat Ukraine on their own.

Translated from Russian by: Kazzura
Original: PolitNavigator

 

“Who are you, the shooter?” – Interview with Igor Strelkov

Conversation between chief editor of “Tomorrow” Mr. Prokhanov and Mr. Igor Strelkov, former Defense Minister of Donetsk People’s Republic.

strelok

Igor, the other day I was in New Russia. And returning, he began to believe the witness what war is. Turns out, the sixteenth. Starting with Damansky, Dzhalanashkol, Afghanistan … Donetsk, Lugansk – sixteenth campaign. And each of these wars is not even his face (which is like a person – every war). And this is some substance that has its subjectivity, its destiny, its development, its memory. Do you feel that war has some features that go beyond the technology of war? How would you describe the Donetsk war in its phases, stages, experiences?

This is my fifth war. There were two Chechen, Transnistria and Bosnia. I want to emphasize its similarity – scenic similarities – from the Bosnian war. Start of the Bosnian war is very similar to what happens in the New Russia. When Yugoslavia broke up and began the parade of sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia, some regions did not want to go to the Muslim Croat Federation and revolted. These republics Bosnian Muslims, Croats suppressed by armed force. And then to help them come Yugoslav People’s Army, but was stopped by Sarajevo under Vukovar, Dubrovnik under. Stopped not because they met serious resistance, but because it could cause the direct intervention of NATO. The army was withdrawn and left their weapons to the Serbs. Now the situation is very similar. And God forbid that it just ended. Because when the JNA left, the Serbs could not organize. Then there was a very long, exhausting war. And then she quickly ended – Croatia defeated each in turn.

But there is the factor of violence. NATO troops and the troops began bombing … And this war as developed in phases?

At first, no one wanted to fight. The first two weeks were held under the banner of the fact that both sides wanted to convince each other. First days in Slavic and we and they are very cautious approach to the use of weapons. The first encounter was with the SBU, which we tried to clean up, but fell into an ambush. Not even quite an ambush, and head-on collisions, to which they were not prepared. Suffered losses and cleaned. Then it was quiet. Ukrainian side began to put roadblocks in our surroundings appeared 25 airmobile brigade. But she was not eager to fight. We managed to disarm first reconnaissance platoon, then the column. It was precisely disarmament – a submachine gun, threatened with burning equipment, they did not dare to join the fight and we were disarmed.

But still a long time we did not touch their roadblocks, and they do not show aggression. These are the first steps.

Then “right quadrant” started throwing us subversive groups – started a firefight. More National Guard under was not – only the “right quadrant.” The Ukrainian side very carefully behaved, step by step palpated as Russia will behave. The first month was not the shelling of the city. The first firing Slavic – at the end of May. Before they shelled the villages, but he did not touch Slovyansk. But as they knew that Russia does not respond, the shelling became more powerful, the actions of armored vehicles and aircraft – more and more massive. In early June, they were finally convinced that Russia does not directly intervene and let the winds. The first massive attack in the Slavonic was the second of May. Next – using all forces and weaponry – tanks and armored vehicles – they held June 3rd. Between these attacks were fighting, local skirmishes.

June and July were the most severe. If in April and May all went on the increase, that is, to expand the territory of the uprising, we gradually put under control settlements Donetsk Republic, spreading movement, in June, we started to recede. Us from all sides began to draw, enemy forces enormously superior in all respects. And the enemy has become the motivation for military action. Start of fire propagation. And further, the higher the motivation increased.

Battalions of the National Guard began to arrive on the battlefield. They were originally motivated, considered the enemy, that is us, as Moscow’s mercenaries. They were confident. that we are all sent from Russia. And the fact that we Slavyansk 90% were local, donbassovtsy not even want to believe.

In June and July, when the aid was extremely small, the enemy drove the huge forces. Generally the increase was not comparable forces. For example, to us during this time came to 40 volunteers, and 80 came to the enemy machines. What’s in them – is another question. But in each machine – a minimum of man.

In August – at the peak of the crisis – we fought in almost agony. Just feverishly to patch holes, and stopped any breakouts. We were in a full operational environment. And they could not break through it. Besides, we have already started as a classic boiler, cut into smaller boilers. Gradually cut Gorlovka …

You talk about the phase when the left of the Slavic in Donetsk?

Yes. In that phase also had two parts. When we came out of the Slavic in Donetsk, this phase was complete confusion of the Ukrainian side. They had fully registered the script, and we do not fit, mixed them all. And suspiciously smoothly everything went at them in this scenario. Very suspicious.

As for the situation with Slavic …. After the Ukrainian side broke through the front under Yampil, we were already hanging by a thread, plug the hole between me and think it was impossible, for it was not strong enough – at least needed a team. And we did not have a reserve.

And when they took Mykolaivka, we do not have any chances. Would have a chance, if we put massively equipment, weapons. I had three tanks, one of them was completely defective, he did not fire a single shot. Only two tanks were combat-ready. With their help, we smashed one checkpoint. But immediately after the defeat of the enemy roadblock at all checkpoints set of four tanks. In Slavyansk ukrov have had seven blocks, and each – four tanks. Any block ukrov technical armed and largest was the hardest Slavic garrison. At the end of the siege, I had 9 broneedinits, including these two tanks and the enemy on every block – seven or eight units, including four tanks. And I had two alternatives: either to sit in a full siege without supplies or out. Prior to this, the supply to the field the road runs. And when the enemy took Mykolaivka, we are left with a field road, but they cut it if we broke the night on this road, it is already the afternoon they had a post.

Thus, embodiments. Sit in the siege. Ammunition for small arms on good fights I have enough for two days. On average intensity – for a week. After fighting under Mykolaivka left me 8 mortars 57 minutes – less than 10 minutes on the mortar. There was not enough and everything else: on heavy weapons lacked ammunition, worst of all with anti-tank weapons. Fights were serious, spent much, and replenishment has been reported. It was all on July 5. “Vacationer” came after 40 days. We have before their arrival did not last. We would not have enough food. And most importantly – the Ukrainian army did not go to the contact battle. When we are forced upon contact fight, then they were losing. And they have taken since Yampol tactics advancing from line to line, throwing forward without infantry armored vehicles only. Before armored vehicles went barrage. If the armor met with resistance, she departed. Again barrage. Then again, armored vehicles. Again barrage – and again technique.

As a result, they began to Nikolaevka methodically destroy. Struck “hurricanes”, “city”, the heavy artillery. Nobody expected such a massive bombardment. Some five-story building in the city is simply formed. Actual civilian casualties we do not know – they are huge.

After this, the enemy just walked Mykolaivka, and I had to bring the remains of the garrison. It was clear that the same thing happened in Slavic – already without pity his thunder. But I could not answer them because there were no shells. They would have fenced with barbed wire, surrounded by mines, as they did with others, taking them into the ring. And would wait when we’ll die of hunger or, or climb a breakthrough. A breakthrough in such conditions would be accompanied by huge losses, and it is unknown whether or not to succeed. But Slavyansk was the core of our team – and a half thousand people, of whom more than a thousand – fighters. In Kramatorsk were about 400 fighters, Kostyantynivka little more than a hundred, fifty Druzhkovka, in other areas of small garrisons on 20-30-50 people. And I knew that from the outside to me, no one will break. Or “Hold” or “East” I did not obey. In Bezlera that Gorlovka based, at that time there were about 350-400 people. If I could not break the ring with his fifteen hundred, then at least it is something the more I could not. It turned out that if I stay in the siege, then after a while I will impose ukry, then start taking a new city by point. That, in fact, began: I did not have time to go already Artiomovsk captured, where they have their man was. And one day completely cleared the Artiomovsk.

At a time when the output of the Slavic, was already on the second environment with cutting off completely Kramatorsk, Druzhkovka, Konstantinovka. This is the way of why I came out of the Slavic, did not defend Kramatorsk: there is also no ammunition.

Given the deep penetration of the enemy to Artiomovskiy (he already went to the Gorlovka practically in our hinterland was), cling Kramators’k did not make sense. We still would have won three or four days, but the result still would go. Any breakthrough, especially – unorganized, accompanied by losses.

Despite the fact that Slavic we left very organized, we have all the armored group died. A tragic accident. They have been together with artillery, to distract the attention of the fire from the place – from the outskirts of Slavyansk. Then, skipping past all the car column, the last to leave – bringing up the rear. But then load the human factor, and armored group went on a line break.

Not to create a flea market, we have all been divided into six columns. Each column was leaving an interval of half an hour. I made a serious mistake, which came in the second column, and did not stay until the end. I had my reasons: Kramatorsk I immediately turned headquarters. But he had, of course, the last to leave.

This would have happened if I was present at the site. And so it is possible to me to say that the fainthearted, hastened to jump.

In general, our losses could be much higher. But the Ukrainian side at night to fight never liked, so we took full artillery, as well as 90% of infantry units and rear.

We in the ranks were 11 mortars and two “Nona” were on the move. Famous “Nona” had to leave because she though it ukry never knocked out, all was in splinters. Due to wear and tear in her left undercarriage. She always dragged back and forth at the end of the gun and went out of her system. As the soldiers joked Ukrainian units that moved us, she in her life did not shoot as much as in Slavyansk.

So – armored group went directly, and it all burned. Blocked the road. The first tank was blown up by mines, the second tried to go round – fell into a ravine. And the rest were shot grenade launchers. Some people survived – jumped out, broke.

If just came appliances – could somehow act, but the whole armor burned. In Kramatorsk I had three infantry fighting vehicles and two APCs. It’s too little – against us were two mechanized battalion tactical groups and a tank battalion.

And if we are able to operate in the building, then resist the enemy in the open country could not.

In our Yampol fortified broke one day, despite the fact that we dug in there were pillboxes, bunkers. We have a shortage of anti-tank weapons – there were no anti-tank gun. Whether then at least one anti-tank gun, at least one “Rapier” is not broke through our defenses, they would, despite the artillery preparation. But with some “bezotkatkami” we could not fight. I knew that taking the fight on open ground – only to lose people.

You said that your opponent out of the Slavianska was totally unexpected.

Yes, he discouraged them. After all, I had ordered categorical – not hand-slavic. And when I said that is going to come out, I repeated several times ordered not to come out to defend Sloviansk to the last. “You certainly deprotected defending Slavic”. Ask, “What will?” Silence. And I – a thousand people and thousands of their family members. Put them I had no right. So I decided to break.

Here are some more time. When I was in the Crimea during the Crimean events, visited the 35th battery. Powerfully impressed me. Roan – is brilliant, he regained almost all their own. No less impressed by the fact that all the commanders Ukrainian Sevastopol Defense: all admirals, generals, pilots – .Ostavili fled for himself commanders of regiments, battalions. Those killed with the soldiers. And when I was in Slavyansk, decided, or I do not go out at all, or I’ll go with the whole garrison. I decided to go out and find it right.

Deeply convinced that if we did not come out of the Slavic, then could not have retained and Donetsk. When we entered the Donetsk – everything there was great. Sat Kiev mayor, police department is still subordinated to Kiev – a classic dual power. The city was not at all prepared for the defense. Checkpoints are equipped with bad roads are not closed, you can go to have whatever you like. And the forces there were very few, they were fragmented, scattered, no one no one obeyed: Detached army was Russian Orthodox, separately – the battalion “Vostok”, separately – “Hold.” Each unit defended their neighborhood, unified management was not.

The problem was not the point, but the fact that the south was almost engulfed in Donetsk, the enemy occupied Amvrosievka. In principle, it has cut us off from the border. DNR was completely under the control of the enemy. And most of the LC was under the control of the enemy. Acted only item – Izvarino, which moved one of my mouth from Kramatorsk, and they have greatly increased defense there.

And just to Donetsk eventually cut off all of the miner, agglomeration Taraevsky-Shakhtarsk Anthracite. On that site was just a few not very powerful roadblocks and Saur-Tomb. And among them were huge holes where you can enter. Ilovaysk was empty – there was no garrison. In Ospina was no garrison or roadblocks.

Arriving in Donetsk, I left only in headquarters commandant company. One battalion broke in Petrovsky district – the south-western tip, which was empty. The remaining forces, and Kramatorsk, and Slavic, were brought to the team, divided into three battalions and Reconnaissance. They were immediately thrown on Ilovaysk, pockmarks. And I formed the front line.

Of its parts?

It is because of its parts. Because the “Vostok” I did not obey. On personal contacts with them managed to establish cooperation. They defended Yasinovataya district, district Avdeyevka, sand, Karlivka. On Karlovka hodgepodge was: first, there were people Bezlera. Then they left, I had to send his back. Then I ordered the retreat, break out, because they cut off from us, there was no point surrounded by two companies lose.

If we had not formed the southern face, I think that everything would be over very quickly. If we stayed in Slavyansk, then a week later, after a maximum of two, fell to Donetsk. And coming, we held forty days before the arrival of Donetsk “vacationers”. Although the last few days were just desperate. When we came out of Donetsk, then try corridors on Russia in the area of ​​Marinka, Kozhevina, brow. At the same time fought their corridors to supply and cut off Yakov all the enemy’s forces.

We kept a corridor with very heavy losses, lost color Third assault battalion in these battles. When we break through the corridor, in the battles of Marinka lost in killed and wounded 120 people in two days – mostly by artillery fire from air strikes. Killed were more than 30. For me it is huge loss.

And at the moment of breakthrough “vacationers” I was a battalion cap is cut into two parts: the part of defending in the snow, and the part with the reconnaissance, was pressed against the edge, cut off.

Besides, I always had to withdraw from the company in Donetsk, throw on other sites. For example, the first company of my miners and antitank platoon had to throw in Debaltseve. Then the same thing had to do with the red beam. Then the fighting started under Ilovaiskaya. At the time of the breakthrough we were separated so that I and the military police went into battle – in Shahtersk fought. In Donetsk, from our Slavic brigade remained virtually only one battalion of two companies, which covered the Petrovsky district. Battalion Kamenska also almost all gone from Donetsk. And left rear: supply, commandant company, which mainly consisted of old and untrained, the combat value of which could only be in the city in street battles, and not in active combat.

Some provisions were in “Hold” and “East”, but “Stronghold” I obeyed partially “East” did not obey. Reproached me that I was not there navёl order. But I had a simple choice when I went from the Slavic either urgently to form a front against the enemy, or to organize a coup. But Donetsk at the time was quite peaceful city. People sunbathing, swimming, athletes trained people in a cafe drinking coffee. As in Moscow in the summer, and in Donetsk was. And I have no one understood. Although my soldiers were eager to arrest all those rear, to disperse. But I understood: it is necessary to deploy a civil war – there is something all of us and slam! I decided that a bad peace is better than a good war, and deliberately left out of it.

Have been in this critical situation and intention to withdraw from Donetsk, forces were unequal something again?

I have the same charge that I wanted to leave Donetsk. I told him honestly at some point, I stopped believing that help will come from Russia in general. Just stop believing! And no one could I guarantee it.

Critical moment for me, as commander, was at the time a breakthrough in Shahtersk. When they knocked us out Debaltseve and just reinforced column of the 25th Brigade went to the Ukrainian Shakhtarsk, entered the city. When they took Debaltseve, I already knew that the next breakthrough will make on Shakhtarsk. I took off the front, that is isolated from other battalions, two companies. And they stood on the loading. And at a time when the enemy entered the Shakhtarsk, one of my company moved there, and the other was on the loading drive there. Accordingly, immediately after that, I took two more companies, then another one, sent back armored group “Hold,” that is created grouping. At the same time I was laid bare Donetsk. Because I was sure that if the enemy and finds itself in Donetsk, here on the streets we somehow it will delay and pass Shakhtarsk – meant completely lose everything.

Since we had a semi-guerrilla army, we were loaded long. Moved too long. All volunteers – family, they were removed from the Slavic. And we are only partially managed to forestall them. One company still entered Shakhtarsk and gave him to take. But ukry cut the road between the miner and Thorez. Then they were off this road barely beat.

Fights have been a whole week, the King commanded – Kononov. That’s why I supported his candidacy for the post of defense minister – as a battalion commander, he showed himself very well. He had a reinforced battalion. Four Slavic company, my company of military police, armored group “Hold” batteries … all this he normally maneuvered. Knocked the 25 Brigade, crushed it with a fairly small losses on their part.

At a time when the enemy cut the road between Miner and Teresa, I have come a psychological crisis, I started thinking about what to do, thinking of transferring headquarters in Shakhtarsk or snow and prepare the evacuation of Donetsk. Because he knew that if aid is not, then you should at least save people.

You do not have the time characterized as psychological change. I followed closely the processes, the dynamics of your performance and maybe the dynamics of your destiny. And I think that you did everything correctly. Did everything right! Based on the real balance of power, otherwise you could not do that. On the other hand, everything that you have done – is messianic feat.

Why do I say that the fracture was? Because at the time I ordered the cook to the headquarters of coagulation, all shtabnikam loaded. People do not discuss my orders because I believed. And I myself went to Shakhtarsk forward. But at this point the road was cut. I spent the whole day there and talked with the men looked. During the day, I almost did not manage Miner’s Brigade, saw that the King of normal coping and intervene with the commander did not want to. By the evening, talking to people, I decided not to leave Donetsk, although this is not planned to leave first Donetsk and Gorlovka. And due to Gorlovka garrison cover northern FAS Donetsk and line on Shakhtarsk. Because we have there was a large, undisguised hole. But there still played a role that was Gorlovka Boatswain, and he defended Gorlovka. Boatswain went absolutely right: it is my order to prepare the evacuation did not obey. And the next day the order was canceled by itself. I realized that in the situation that has developed, we can arrange to withdraw its troops from Donetsk neither, nor from Gorlovka. We cut off the last road and field roads are very uncomfortable. I personally presented the evacuation of Donetsk and Gorlovka – columns of refugees were shot on the roads from all sides. Understand that it is better to take the fight in Donetsk, than all these breakthroughs. In the evening I returned to Donetsk and has, despite the gravity of the situation, did not plan any transfer of staff, nothing.

This I answered the question, whether there was a plan for Donetsk. Plan was not putting in Donetsk, and the intention of leaving Donetsk as an option to output and rescue, effort and money.

Alignment of the front and roll Mariupol – it’s only the “vacationers” do, or militias also participated?

Separate divisions militia were subordinated to them. But mainly in Mariupol advancing “vacationers”. When they left, remained precarious and the front line, and opportunities.

Firstly, Mariupol was empty, there was no two days Ukrainian military could take without a fight. But there was an order not to occupy. Not just the order to stop, and the order in any case does not hold. Just Volnovakha could take.

Why do I say that events similar to events in extreme: there Yugoslav People’s Army stopped just a step to a decisive victory.

Igor Ivanovich, how do you do in the war dived?

I was a counselor in the Crimea Aksenov. He is a man of great charisma, clever, competent, sane, talented. I commanded the only unit of the Crimean militia: a special purpose company, which carried out combat missions. But after the battle of the cartographic part, when two died (and I commanded this fight), a company was disbanded, people went home.

When events took place in the Crimea, it was clear that one Crimea is not over. Crimea as part of New Russia – a huge acquisition, the jewel in the crown of the Russian Empire. And one of Crimea, cut isthmuses hostile state – not the same.

When the Ukrainian authorities broke up before our eyes, in the Crimea constantly arriving delegates from areas of New Russia, who would like to repeat at what was in the Crimea. It was a clear desire to continue the process at all. Delegates at planned uprising and asked for help. Aksenov, because he has such a load fell, it is 20 hours a day working, asked me to engage in the Northern Territory. And he made me an adviser on this issue. I began to work with all the delegates: from Odessa, Nikolaev, from Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk. All had full confidence that if the uprising will develop, Russia will come to the rescue. So I gathered nerazehavshihsya fighters company, to recruit volunteers. 52 people gathered.

In Slavic came quite by accident. We needed a middle city. 52 people – a force more or less in small settlements. And I was told that in the Slavic strongest local assets. This option we evaluated as the best.

How overgrown people subdivisions your movement?

When we arrived in Slavic, on the basis of a person we met 150-200. And they participated in the storming of the ATC with us. In the police department had a lot of weapons – a hundred rifles and pistols 100-150. People immediately armed. Part, however, pilfered.

The next day we took Kramators’k: I went there Cossack division – 30 people. And off we go. Then it all depended on the availability of weapons. The first months were a lot of volunteers, but we had nothing to arm. When the fighting began, the real blood flowed, the number of volunteers poumenshilos.

But still there were many. I reported figures by the end of May to Donetsk Republic enlisted 28,000 people. 28 thousand people actually waited weapons. If even half dismiss: criminal elements, random, even half – is 14 thousand people. If we had weapons, the situation has evolved quite differently than it has evolved. By the time of my departure from Donetsk to us under the gun and 10,000 were not. In Slavic brigade was on the list of about 9,000. But of them combatants, that is directly fighters, about 5000. Others – tylovikov, cooks, volunteers, supplies …

When you fought in Slavyansk, you were just a military or feel and a politician? People are turning to you, ask, “Who are you, shooter?”

Frankly, I’m not going to in any way that is not involved in politics, but even light. In Crimea, I also did a lot. Negotiations on the surrender of Staff Navy I started going there alone, and talked with all the staff. But the fact that I never lit up. Yes, somewhere in the photos some colonel. I’m not saying that in reserve or retired. To solve my tactical tasks was beneficial to me all considered valid. However, I never cried that I act. Simply said – Colonel. And they themselves think out. Well, that’s thought, some colonel. What I retiree knew a few people. And others thought they wanted. Neither the name, nor the name of my not know.

So I planned to behave in Slavyansk. Was going to find a charismatic leader and help as an advisor. The first time I did so. Therefore Ponomarev flashed all the time. He – People’s mayor. was very active. Was useful in its time. Then things went differently. And I have not found anyone who could move as a political leader.

And then just come to light up the team: come Denis Pushilin its fully support. Although I already burned all the bridges, no documents have been there all the fighters left the documents when crossing the border, but it is possible to cut off the retreat as such at all.

As soon as I without a mask, without “Balaklava” appeared on TV with Pushilin, first of all, everyone understood who the shooter. Although previously knew that really I command, interception has already been published, was my identikit, but then I saw firsthand. Immediately I figured, was taken to an apartment in Moscow. I did not consider this point: not even have time to notify relatives. Relatives I do in the course never introduced: that I, where, how. As a result, I have suffered the loss of a personal level because of this exposure, because I can not live with myself, to enjoy their own library. Not to mention how many survived my relatives who learned everything on TV, too. Throughout the war in Slavyansk I had a military dictatorship. And then I would not climb.

Do you think that your experience – a purely military, not a political one. You were the Minister of Defence, the brigade commander?

In Slavyansk was a battalion, brigade was not. The first Slavic volunteer battalion. It was a banner, standard. Prior to the release of the Slavic I actually did not carry out any effect on the Donetsk as defense minister. I gradually been building front. I really obeyed Brain, I sometimes put him problems. In marching against me he did not obey, but tactically. operational – obeyed. I saw his front line by line Lisicansk-Krasny Liman. Garrison Sloviansk obey, obey Kramators’k, Druzhkivka-Kostiantynivka. For a while I obeyed and Horlovks, Bezler because I helped him – sent a detachment to the cleaning of the city, without my squad, he would not have taken control.

I think everything that happened then in Slavic and Donetsk with you, one way or another connected with the restoration of the state. And you do not just involved in the restoration of the military organization, but also the state as a whole. That is, you had consciously or unconsciously political role, you stand at the origins of the establishment of the state.

At that moment I knew perfectly well that alone Donetsk and Lugansk fight against ukrov can not. Even more so – in the absence of its own military industry, effective government of the local. And I originally came from the fact that repeated Crimean option – Russia will enter. It was the best option. And people in this endeavor. Nobody was going to play for Luhansk and Donetsk republic. All were initially – for Russia. And the referendum was conducted for Russia, and went to war for Russia. People wanted to join Russia. Russian flags were everywhere. I was at the headquarters of the Russian flag and all. And we are perceived by the population under the Russian flag. We thought comes the Russian administration, the rear will be organized by Russia and will be another republic within Russia. And about some nation-building, I thought. And then, when I realized that Russia us to not take myself (I can associate with the host), for us, this decision was a shock.

It is not final.

We have nothing definitive, that’s the thing. War is six months, and we still do not know, “edyna” Ukraine without “edyna” Ukraine. What is more important to us: gas supply, or the Russian population in the Southeast?

Would like to see and then, and then. But it is impossible.

And if not, then after all, what is more important? Reported to me that day in Donetsk bombed. Every day send complete lists of hits: where horrible, where a projectile. That is, the day before, with two in the morning to five in the morning just carried the city. Spacing! One day, from early morning until late at night – ran down. A little more – and turn in Stalingrad. And we will haggle over a hundred for oil. And it turns out that in trade relations with Ukraine, we are working to help her survive and fight at the front.

Actually, if I were aimed to seize power in the DNI, I could grab, no problem. When I came from the Slavic Donetsk, everyone was waiting for, I grab power. But I had the task of defending the republic, not to seize power. I would love to go back. And I believe that everything is done right …

I think so too.

But the trigger war still hit me. If our party does not crossed the border, in the end everything would come to an end, as in Kharkov, as in Odessa. It would be several dozen killed, burnt arrested. And this would have ended. A flywheel is almost a war that still goes on, ran our unit. We mixed all the cards on the table. All of them! And from the very beginning, we began to fight in earnest: to destroy the subversive groups “pravosekov.” And I am personally responsible for what is happening there. For what is still shelled Donetsk – I am responsible. For the fact that the Slavic left, of course, I am responsible. And because he did not released, I also have a responsibility.

But, because “in the absence of a stamp, write a simple” – we create a movement that at least so humanitarian support militia.

To say that we provide them, you can not. But we really help. Half the army now dressed in winter clothes, which we put them. Our assistance goes to the troops. And to provide humanitarian assistance to the population is only capable of the Russian state. Only the state! From state reserves should be taken. With the money that is going to, we can help militia, families, wounded, but that is not all.

Looking back on your life, do not you think that all the fractures in your life, throws, war – is the result of some mysterious logic that lies not even in your nature, and destiny?

I am against any mysticism in this regard. Just think that in every situation we must do – does not always work, unfortunately – correct: “Do what you must, come what may.”

But the situation arise by chance or logical?

To the mess that was formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, could be anything. In war you meet these people who have been and even more experienced. I was under the gun cameras. But there are a huge number of people who deserve much more. And passed more and more talented in many ways. I have fought the officer, who knows three languages ​​before Donetsk passed five wars. Absolutely unique destiny. But for some inaccuracies of these people are under a bushel. Maybe their time more will come. This mystic – a real accident.

But mysticism has its own field. It exists somewhere, somewhere realized. And realized not in the stars, and in human relations. You do not try on political caftan?

Very want me to try on the coat. But honestly – I chore never liked. I – scout trooper, as Denis Davydov. He was always bored by regular service. Though promoted to the rank of generals, best manifested itself as a partisan.

– Human breakthrough, always go to the island. The greatest successes that I do best – where he had to go first to break through, to engender, to start building. Next must come the other – to build. This – at first. And secondly, I do not possess the necessary skills. If you go into politics, I could show itself is a turning point. Routine me contraindicated. I myself get bored, lose interest. We now have a relatively stable situation. Our policy is based on the principle that smeared – welcome. There is a hook on you – so you can work with you. And now an honest man in politics has nothing to do. I hope that something will change. Still, the war, it makes a big difference.

In the history of the Russian military were unsuccessful politicians. For some reason they did not know how to write himself into politics, even when they were the military aristocracy. The unhappy fate of the Decembrists. Amazingly behaved military in the last days of the Romanov Empire …

There was just cheating.

Here’s military and engaged in politics – give power Guchkov, Shulgin. A Tukhachevsky? Failed to do anything. Zhukov was the host country, the power in his hands was absolute. He handed it to Khrushchev.

The military secretly laid the subjugation function.

Just do not have the Latin American …

Latin American military in the ground and are committed to each other’s overthrow. A world wars are not won.

And the Turkish military? No, there are other military traditions. Russian military ever really get the power, gave politicians who then with them and also dealt.

I’m not entirely military in the classical sense. The command of this kind to me rather casually. I – the secret services.

As the secret services, you have the chance to become a major politician.

Politics now – it’s manipulating elections. Lie on the screen, lie everywhere. Superior quality policy – to spin like a weathervane. I can not turn around like a weathervane, and do not want to be able to. I want to die an honest man. And I will not lie to any screen in any way. If I can not honestly say it is better to say nothing. I can work around any theme, nothing more. Lie directly, I will not. Categorically do not want to.

In today’s political system has no place for me, I understand it very well.

Maybe at this moment. But the story is changeable, especially Russian history. It has great dynamics. I feel the whole skin that time, these peace and truce completely illusory. The most expensive in humans – it’s reputation. You have a great reputation.

She is now trying to drown.

Do not pay attention. Flex that you hang, laughable. Maybe you will be the temptation to be magicians who want to enchant you. Wait until he blow pipe again.

Hope the rain.

Jericho pipe is always ready, do not worry.

The main thing is that the copper is not sounded.

Brass you are through, leaving Jericho. Strelkovs took his place in Russian history. He did what he could do. And that, dear Igor, a precious resource with you our historical reality.

Translated from Russian by: Przemysław Pawełczyk
Original: Zavtra

Strelkov: Why I did not join the “Russian March”

Instead of the March, the hero of the Defence of Slavyansk visited a shrine on November 4

The legendary former commander of Novorossiya, Igor Strelkov, had planned to take part in the Russian March. Many patriots and nationalists were expecting him—with mixed feelings. Andrey Savelyev [leader of the Great Russia political party -ed.] said that Strelkov will march with him and for him. Savelyev is not to everyone’s taste. Even among the nationalists, he stands apart: he is bitterly opposed to the Russian government, but supportive of Novorossiya. There was many a sharp intake of breath when it was heard that Strelkov would be marching alongside him. But Strelkov decided not to go. Instead, Igor Ivanovich went to the temple to pray to the Virgin Mary on the day of the Icon of Our Lady of Kazan. I asked Strelkov why he did not join the Russian March, and he responded to these and other questions with the sincerity and frankness of a soldier.

Strelkov: I heard Savelyev’s morning speech, and it angered me. He very improperly used an excerpt from my video appeal, where I called on people to join the march in support of Novorossiya. I was not invited by Savelyev, but, rather, by other people associated with the families of dead soldiers; I do not share many of Savelyev’s political ideas.

Svobodnaya Pressa: You’re an experienced person, Igor Ivanovich. You weren’t aware who Andrei Savelyev is?

S: Contrary to what they say about me, I have never engaged with the Slav nationalist movement, and I did not know the people operating in this field. I am meeting many of them for the first time. I was attracted by the fact that Savelyev supported Novorossiya, and only this morning did I realize that he also has another political agenda.

I wanted a demonstration for Novorossiya that involved people with diverse political views, including people with socialist ideas, and of course, the nationalists. But with people who oppose the Russian state order, I have no truck.

SP: Someone tried to set you up?

S: I am not ready to consider what happened a set up. People can make mistakes, give in to wishful thinking.

SP: Novorossiya was an important turning point in your life?

S: Yes, until this campaign I had never been to the Donbass. But after having fought there for four months, I now feel a great responsibility for the people who stayed there. I will do everything in my power to help Novorossiya, even if there are some who do not like this. And aiding Novorossiya is what I called for in my address, which did not say a word about the political situation in Russia itself. Among the supporters of Novorossiya there are monarchists, anarchists, communists, nationalists, and all of them have fought bravely for Novorossiya.

SP: You have fought in Chechnya, Dagestan, and other places. Why is Novorossiya so close to your heart?

S: In other places I commanded small units, and only in Novorossiya did I get to command the whole theatre of operations, to be responsible for so many people. It is quite another matter.

SP: How do you try to aid Novorossiya in your new position?

S: There is no “new position” as yet, it is only just emerging. We are forming a social movement to organize assistance to the rear. It is necessary to deliver humanitarian aid, winter clothes for the soldiers, shoes, food. A dedicated and experienced team has rallied around me to work on this. I hope that Russian patriots will help us within their own means, so that the Novorossiya Militia will have everything that is needed.

SP: At your press conference, you said that much of the humanitarian aid to Novorossiya was stolen. Did you encounter this personally?

S: I myself was continuously fighting the war, and was not involved in procurement. But I believe that much of the aid to Novorossiya was plundered. At least half of everything that was sent to Novorossiya did not reach its destination. Rather large volumes of it disappeared, and no one knows where to. It is in order to change this situation that we are creating our movement, to organize under one aegis food supplies, equipment and humanitarian aid, so that this does not occur again.

SP: People say that you have little experience with organizing the rear and with logistics—since you are primarily a fighting man. Do you fear that you will not be able to cope with the supply operation, that theft will happen again, and that the person blamed—that will be you?

S: If I were afraid of acting, I would not do anything. I really have little experience in logistics and supply, but I have a good team. I will not be leading the movement as a logistics specialist, but as a man known for his devotion to the cause, a man who is absolutely honest and who is not going to make a profit from aid.

SP: November 4 is not only the Day of National Unity, but also the day of the Icon of Our Lady of Kazan. What does this mean for you?

S: It means a lot to me. Let me just say that instead of joining the “Russian March” I went to a shrine, and prayed to the Mediatrix of the Russian Land [the Virgin Mary in her role as intercessor -ed.]. I had a choice: a shrine or a march; I chose the shrine.

SP: I am hugely impressed by your sincerity and openness. I should like to take advantage of it. Which military operation in Novorossiya are you most proud of? What has been your greatest achievement in battle? How do you rate this campaign?

S: For me, the four months of the campaign in Novorossiya—from April to August—were one continuous battle. I can not divide it into individual operations. I made a lot of mistakes—political and military. At first I thought that Russia would quickly recognize Novorossiya, and that is what I built my strategy on. There were also errors because of the lack of military experience. I had no military education, I did not graduate from any military school or academy; I am self-taught, and this affected things. I lacked the military training, knowledge and skills to command a large force, and to organize logistics and the rear.

Now, perhaps, there are qualified military specialists and advisers there—I do not know. Back then, there were none. However much we tried, we could not find any. Professional military men apparently waited until we could pay a salary and establish a good supply. Back then, there were only autodidacts, like me.

SP: But there was a military leader, known by the call sign “Delphin”.

S: I met him a month before my retirement, in Krasnodon. He is, of course, a good military expert, but all of his military experience was in commanding regular troops—where there is discipline and unconditional subordination. But here, we had guerrillas, scattered groups. He did everything in his power, but was not able to fully take command. He could only coordinate between the individual units.

SP: And finally—what do you think about the elections held in Novorossiya?

S: Discussing how democratic they were is simply ridiculous. Elections in wartime—this is nonsense. I left Novorossiya in August, it is difficult for me to judge who the population supports now. When I was there, I had little interest in public opinion and who the population would vote for. I had a war to fight. So I would rather not discuss the current leadership of Novorossiya.

* * *

Thus, Strelkov stubbornly refuses to integrate into Russian political life, and even more so, into the extreme political opposition. Some may not like this, but Strelkov has little interest in public opinion. He does what he believes is right.

(Source)

Original: Svobodnaya Pressa
Translated: Tatzhit Mihailovich / Edited by @GBabeuf

Igor Strelkov visted the Crimean Cossacks

On Oct 14, Crimea was visited by the former commander in chief of the militia of the Donetsk Republic, Igor Strelkov. Soldier visited the oldest Church in the name of the Mother of God “the Sign” and congratulated the Crimean Cossacks. Igor Strelkov:

The kulesh was delicious, the Crimean wine – wonderful, the weather – amazing! You can rely on Cossacks if they are fighting in the ranks of serious combat units. When their chieftain is alright – the Cossacks fight alright too.

With the icon of St Nicholas, Igor Strelkov left parting words for the Crimean Cossacks:

On the day of the Intercession of the Blessed Virgin, Oct 14, with brotherly hugs and wishes to firmly bear Cossack honor for the sake of the Fatherland.

As previously reported, on Oct 14, Orthodox believers of the Crimea had the feast of the Intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary.

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In the Crimea was a procession in honor of the Holy virgin

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On Oct 14, Orthodox believers of the Crimea had the feast of the Intercession of the blessed virgin Mary. According to legend, the basis of the holiday is the supposed phenomenon of the Mother of God in the Besieged Constantinople. Mary protected the Christians and the enemy retreated. In the most ancient temple in the name of the Mother of God “the Sign” the Abbot of the temple hieromonk Mark celebrated the festal divine Liturgy. After passed the traditional procession with the participation of the clergy, parishioners and the Cossacks. Father Mark said that the Cossacks have always been the true defenders of the Orthodox faith. At such a difficult time it is the spiritual unity that can withstand all the troubles and guide on the right path. The Church dates back from the initial centuries of Christianity. In the past, the place was a cave where the early Christians prayed. Also survived “the altar in the sanctuary”, a special location on the stones of the chapel in the name of Mary Magdalene. The current name of the temple was in 1792 by the name of an ancient icon of the Kremlin letter of the Mother of God “the Sign”. As previously reported, the Ministry of culture of the Russian Federation adopted a decision on the restoration of monasteries and mosques in Crimea.

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(Source)

Igor Strelkov: the Militia will win. Behind them the truth, God is with them

The following interview was conducted on October 9th between Strelkov and Orthodox journalist Igor Evsin at the Monastery of St. John the Theologian in Ryazan. Orthodox, monarchist, and patriot, Strelkov is no mercenary, but a centurion of the Third Rome. In it Strelkov makes clear his strong opposition to the Minsk Accords, which he regards as a betrayal of the Novorrossiyan cause by a pro-Western group within the Russian elite whom he has previously referred to as a “Fifth Column”.  He also however shows a genuine understanding and even sympathy for some of the Ukrainians he has fought against, though not for their political masters in Kiev.

Igor Vasilevich Evsin: Igor Ivanovich, I’ll honestly say that in recent days I can’t escape the thought that the Minsk Agreements resemble the Khasavyurt Agreements that set down the “beginning of the end” of the First Chechen War and led to the Second.

Igor Ivanovich Strelkov: It looks like this is so…Now we are trying not to permit another “Khasavyurt” in the Donbass.

In general I came to this opinion when I saw that the militia’s broad and victorious offensive was stopped over political reasons of some kind. What do you think, what would have been if it wasn’t stopped?

Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, which we left to preserve our military potential, would today be ours, not to speak of Mariupol. Do you know that when they stopped the offensive, advance detachments of the militia had already entered Mariupol? The Ukrainians just ran away from our onslaught. Mariupol was empty…And then there you are! They stopped the offensive, and the peace negotiations in Minsk began, and they had me “leave” at that time because I was categorically against stopping the offensive. But my fears were completely justified. Today, thanks to the “cease-fire,” Ukrainian forces regrouped, brought up heavy armaments and prepared for new battles. Now this is not the same panicked army that, if we had not stopped our offensive, would already have been defeated.

Overall for the people of the Donbass, the greatest tragedy is that the referendum on the creation of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics was not recognized by Russia as the referendum on Crimea’s annexation was. And already no one thought that the rebellion would lead to such a shameful result as the Minsk Agreements.

Evsin: Igor Ivanovich, one other question worries me among all the “incomprehensibles” happening in the Ukraine. Why are Ukrainians not revolting against the Kiev government that, having unleashed war in the Donbass, is killing civilians – women, the elderly, children. Or do they not know about this?

Strelkov: They know. They even know very well. They are constantly shown television scenes of the bombardment of Donetsk and Lugansk, shown murdered civilians, and constantly it’s drummed into their heads, “Look at what Russian terrorists are doing on Ukrainian land.” The people are hypnotized and believe; they are enraged and support the Kiev government fighting these very “Russian terrorists and separatists.”

Evsin: But there still must be something humane in the Kiev security forces…After all, they know that what they’re doing is simply beyond imagination, simply isn’t subject to comprehension.

Strelkov: Igor Vasilevich, what do you expect from them? The most genuine Satanists came to power in Kiev. And that’s why their methods of waging war are satanic.

Evsin: I have the sense that Ukrainians have been seized by some kind of possession resembling the Russian people’s possession, when after the 1917 Revolution, Russians were shooting Russians…

Strelkov: The militia is not party to this possession. Otherwise you’re wholly correct. There is a civil war underway in the Ukraine, one like the Civil War in Russia.

Evsin: But there is the opinion that it’s an international war or even the Third World War.

Strelkov: I don’t think so. Among the general number of Ukrainian forces, mercenaries are a very small percentage. Two-thirds of Ukrainian soldiers are Russians whom one can even call ethnically Russian. They speak Russian, and many of them think as Russians. Moreover, real Russian volunteers from Russia are fighting on the Ukrainian side. That’s how it is…

Evsin: Then how then can these “Russian Ukrainians” fire on peaceful cities and conduct punitive actions against their own brothers?

Strelkov: If we’re speaking of the artillery bombardment of peaceful cities, then those who are firing don’t know what they are firing on. They hit wherever they’re given guidance. They don’t know the consequences of their strikes. But the punitive actions are conducted by already totally ferocious nationalists, drugged, brainwashed, and unaccountable for their actions. No reasonable arguments have an effect on them. There develops the impression that methods of neuro-linguistic programming are being practiced on them. This also concerns the volunteers from Russia who are fighting alongside the Ukrainians.

Evsin: But what are the Ukrainians fighting for?

Strelkov: The Ukrainians? They think they’re fighting for the liberation of the Donbass from “Russian separatists and terrorists,” for national sovereignty, for a unified and indivisible Ukraine, for her independence from Russia. Although among them there are more than a few who understand the situation and that they are fighting their own people. And therefore they only make an appearance of fighting. Generally there are also many who don’t want to fight for anybody. But behind them are the blocking detachments…And there have already been cases when draftees who didn’t wish to fight and left the army were shot by these blocking detachments. They’re killing their own men…

Evsin: And the people of the Donbass? What are they fighting for?

Strelkov: Note that the Donbass people didn’t attack the Ukrainians, but the Ukrainians attacked them. The people of the Donbass are fighting for their land, the land of their ancestors. And I know with certainty that they will defend it whatever may come. Even if a second “Khasavyurt” occurs, even if Russia refuses to help, they won’t lay down their arms. The Donbass people fight for justice, for the right to be Russians, for Russian culture, for Orthodoxy. And I believe they will win, because truth is with them and God is with them. In the final analysis, the militia are fighting against a satanic Kiev government supported by the West and the United States.

Evsin: How can we in Russia help the Donbass militia today?

Strelkov: Soon it will be winter. Therefore the militiamen will very much need warm winter sleeping bags, warm-weather items, food, and medical supplies. And of course the Donbass army greatly needs heavy armaments, but that is already another issue…

Evsin: Collections for humanitarian aid to the Donbass are ongoing throughout Russia, and very actively. And nonetheless is this not enough?

Strelkov: It would be sufficient if the aid collected in Russia was fully delivered to the Donbass. The problem is that it is partially stolen by fraudulent “assistance funds” and partially it just “evaporates.” Meaning that in Russia there exist forces opposed to delivery of aid to the Donbass. People who today are officially engaged in issues of aid, men such as Vladislav Surkov, for example. These people are impeding the delivery of the collected aid packages to the Donbass with all their strength. That’s why the Donbass people should prepare for basic survival…From my part, I am trying to expose this gang of traitors. They’re not going to be able to quietly throw Novorossiya to the wolves.

Evsin: And how probable is a betrayal of Novorossiya?

Strelkov: I will say again that even if Russia refuses to help, the men of the Donbass won’t lay down their arms. But I think that the matter won’t reach a betrayal of Novorossiya. In Russia there are still concrete people and influential forces that are counteracting this. Even the result of the Minsk Agreements can be considered a Pyrrhic victory of the “treachery faction” of the tribe of Judas, to which Surkov belongs.

Evsin: Those who signed off on the regulation plan for the situation in the Ukraine’s southeast, i.e. Chubais, Gref, and others, are they also part of this Judas tribe “treachery faction?”

Strelkov: Yes, they also are. They are speculating that Putin doesn’t want a major war and major losses. He doesn’t want Russia to be thought of as an occupied nation. And he’s right in this. But I hope he will do away with the treachery faction. Observing Putin’s actions, I see that he doesn’t plan on leaving the militia to the whims of fate, and he’s not planning to “betray” Novorossiya. He is rendering her any assistance that one could in the situation that’s arisen.

Evsin: Can we ourselves directly send aid to the Donbass, for example, by transferring money to the militia’s financial accounts?

Strelkov: And how will you know if this isn’t a fraudulent account? Plenty of those have been created. Therefore it’s best to give over aid through the churches. We still have such churches where they are collecting aid for the Donbass.

Evsin: Today in the media they’re whipping up the theme that among the militiamen there are also “bad apples.” Is this so?

Strelkov: Among the militiamen? Well…Not everyone’s a saint there. There are those who instead of fighting guzzle vodka. And then among the commanders…I already said that I’m simply ashamed of some of the commanders.

But most important is nevertheless that those who rebelled in their majority know they are fighting for an idea. They understand that Novorossiya is part of the Russian world. And we should all understand that the Donbass up to and including Odessa is part of Russia, a region torn away by coercion in 1991 by traitors to the Russian world. Even more so, to speak of Novorossiya as a sovereign entity separate from Russia, and even more as Ukrainian territory, is simply impermissible. Novorossiya today is a bastion of Russia.

Evsin: If we return to the “bad apples,” many have the existing hope that you can return to the Donbass and bring about order there. Many are awaiting for the moment when “Igor will arrive and settle things.”

Strelkov: I have already spoken about this in other interviews. There’s simply no possibility of me returning to the Donbass, if only because no one will allow me to. I wasn’t removed from Novorossiya in order to return. And I must disappoint those who are waiting for “Igor to arrive and settle things.” But I have opportunities in Russia to render effective assistance to Novorossiya. I didn’t come here to sit in inaction. I will do everything so that the militia is victorious. And we will be victorious. Truth is with us, and God is with us.

This interview was translated by Mark Hackard.

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